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The Supreme Court and Constitutional stare decisis 
T 
his column is the sec­
ond in a series of three 
considering some po­
tential implications of June
Medical Services v. Russo, a 
case involving a constitutional 
challenge to a Louisiana law 
regulating access to abortion 
services. The United States 
Supreme Court heard argu­
ments in the case on March 4, 
2020. A decision is expected 
by the end of June. More on 
the case below. 
The first column sought to 
place June Medical Services
in context by describing the 
history of constitutional abor­
tion-rights litigation at the 
Supreme Court. This piece 
explains what the case is 
likely to tell us about the re­
spect the court will show to 
prior constitutional rulings 
with which it disagrees. The 
final installment will use the 
case to highlight the constitu­
tional difficulties presented by 
laws enacted for disingenuous 
or deceptive reasons. 
Let's start by defining 
terms. The Latin phrase stare
decisis Oiterally, "to stand by 
what's been decided") de­
scribes a foundational princi­
ple of the American legal sys­
tem: that courts ordinarily fol­
low prior, on-point decisions 
issued by appeals courts 
within their jurisdictipns. 
The doctrine has two 
branches: vertical stare deci­
sis and horizontal stare deci­
sis. Vertical stare decisis is 
the term used to describe the 
requirement that lower courts 
follow the rulings of higher 
courts of the same jurisdic­
tion. Vertical stare decisis is a 
mandatory doctrine. 
Thus, for example, New 
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Hampshire state trial courts 
must follow the decisions of 
the New liampshire Supreme 
Court on issues of New 
Hampshire law. On the fed­
eral side, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of New 
Hampshire must follow the 
decisions of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit 
on issues of federal law. And 
all of these courts must follow 
the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court on is­
sues of federal law. 
Horizontal stare decisis, in 
contrast, is a discretionary 
doctrine. It is the term used to 
describe the usual practice of 
high courts to treat their own
prior rulings as binding. 
Thus, for example, in the 
vast majority'of cases, the 
New Hampshire Supreme 
Court will apply its own prior 
decisions on issues of New 
Hampshire law. And the 
United States Supreme Court 
will do the same on matters of 
federal law. 
But because these courts 
are empowered to have the fi­
nal say about the meaning of 
law within their jurisdictions, 
the doctrine of hQrizontal 
stare decisis does not require
them to follow their own pJ:'.ior 
_SUNDAY� MONITOR& New Hampshire Patriot 
Winner of 2008 Pulitzer Prize 
Steve Leone, editor 
Jonathan Van Fleet, managing editor 
Dana Wormald, opinion editor 
Ralph Jimenez, editorial page writer 
Laura A. Kiernan, editorial page writer 
Mike Pride, editor emeritus 
rulings. On rare occasions, 
these courts will overrule 
their precedents and estab­
lish new law. 
Appellate courts apply the 
doctrine of horizontal stare
decisis for both theoretical 
and practical reasons. Theo­
retically, the doctrine pro­
motes legal stability and con­
tinuity over time, and rein­
forces the ideal that the law is 
more than just the opinions of 
the individuals holding judi­
cial office at any given point in 
time. Practically, the doctrine 
is necessary for courts to 
function. Imagine if courts 
were obliged to decide each 
and every legal issue afresh in 
every case. The judicial sys­
tem would grind to a halt. 
Courts considering 
whether to overrule a prece­
dent tend to base their deci­
sion on four factors. First, has 
the rule adopted in the prior 
case proved to be unworkable 
for courts or as it applies in 
real life? Second, would 
changing the rule cause harm 
to those who have· relied on it 
in ordering their affairs or 
damage the stability of the so­
ciety governed by it? Third, 
has the law's growth in the in­
tervening years led society to 
discount the rule? Fourth, has 
new knowledge emerged that 
calls into q1:1estion the rule's 
factual underpinnings? 
These factors make courts 
very reluctant to overrule 
precedents in the fields of 
contract and property law. 
Courts recognize that, in en­
tering into contracts and mak­
ing arrangements to dispose 
of property, organizations and 
individuals rely heavily on the 
stability of the legal regimes 
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within which they act. Con­
sider, for example, the chaos 
that would ensue if the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court 
changed a fundamental prin- · 
ciple of property law in a way 
that would require many New 
Hampshire residents to 
rewrite their wills in order to 
make them effective. 
But what of constitutional 
law? How strongly should 
these horizontal stare decisis
factors argue for caution in 
overruling constitutional 
precedents? 
As with much else in con­
stitutional law, judges 
strongly disagree about the 
answer to this question. 
On the one hand, some 
judges think that these fac­
tors should drive the analysis 
with respect to constitutional 
precedents in much the same 
way as in other areas of law. 
In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey (1992), the court in­
voked the horizontal stare de­
cisis factors to explain why it 
would not overturn the core 
ruling in Roe v. Wade (1973), 
which held that women have a 
fundamental right to termi­
nate a pregnancy during its 
first two trimesters. Casey
said that Roe's core ruling 
provides a workable prece­
dent that is neither obsolete 
nor built from dubious factual 
premises. 
In addition, women have to 
come to rely on the promise of 
reproductive freedom and au­
tonomy that Roe's core hold­
ing assures. And perhaps 
most importantly, overruling 
Roe in response to the intense 
opposition it has generated 
would reinforce the misper­
ception that the court is less a 
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legal institution than just an­
other arena in which partisan 
politics play out. 
But on the other hand, 
some judges do not believe 
that horizontal stare decisis
has a strong role to play in 
constitutional law. Casey was 
a 5-4 decision in which the 
court was bitterly divided. 
The dissenting justices, led by 
Justice Antonin Scalia, re­
jected the majority's stare de­
cisis rea�oning and insisted 
that correctly interpreting the 
constitution is almost always 
more important than follow­
ing wrongly decided prece­
dent. 
This is a perspective Jus­
tices Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas (who joined Justice 
Scalia's Casey dissent) 
shared frequently, in a num­
ber of cases and extra-judicial 
writings. And it is not a posi­
tion held only by judicial con­
servatives. A number of very 
prominent liberal constitu­
tional theorists also hold this 
view. 
So back to June Medical
Services v. Russo (2020) and 
what it may foreshadow. As 
explained in my previous col­
umn, the Louisiana law chal­
lenged in the case requires 
that physicians performing 
abortions hold admitting priv­
ileges at a hospital within 30 
miles of the abortion facility. 
But abortion is a safe proce­
dure that rarely requires hos­
pitalization. And hospitals 
usually condition admitting 
privileges on the number of 
patients that a physician ad­
mits. 
The law thus creates a 
catch-22. Physicians who per­
form abortions now must 
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have admitting privileges at a 
nearby hospital. Yet they can­
not obtain or maintain such 
privileges because the need to 
hospitalize abortion patients 
arises so rarely. That is why, 
in Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt (2016), the 
Supreme Court struck down a 
nearly identical Texas law by 
a 5-3 vote. (Justice Scalia's 
seat was then open because of 
his recent death.) 
Of course, things have 
changed in the four years 
since the court decided Whole
Woman's Health. Justice Neil 
Gorsuch has filled Justice 
Scalia's seat. And Justice An­
thony Kennedy, one of the five 
justices who joined the major­
ity opinion, has retired and 
been replaced by Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh. Time will 
tell, but both justices almost 
certainly disagree with the 
view that the right to abortion 
should receive special consti­
tutional protection. 
Will the newly constituted 
court overrule Whole
Woman's Health, a precedent 
that is a mere four years old? 
The answer to this question 
will tell us much about the 
role the current court sees for 
the doctrine of horizontal 
stare decisis in the area of 
constitutional law. 
(John Greabe teaches con­
stitutional law and directs 
the Warren B. Rudman Cen­
ter for Justice, Leadership & 
Public Service at the Univer­
sity of New Hampshire 
Franklin Pierce School of 
Law. The opinions he ex­
presses in his "Constitutional 
Connections" columns are 
entirely his own.)
The Monitor welcomes letters to the editor on matters of 
public interest. The length limit is 250 words, and all 
letters are subject to editing. Letters must include an 
address and phone number. Send to letters@ 
cmonitor.com. Letters chosen for publication will also be 
published at concordmonitor.com. 
